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AMERICA'S MELTING POT: LANGUAGE NOT INCLUDED. U.S.
WORKPLACE LANGUAGE DISCRIMINATION AND
THE EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH
AS A MODEL FRAMEWORK
INTRODUCTION
America has long struggled with its identity as a melting pot of
many peoples.' Americans recognize multiculturalism as a great
strength of their country and embrace differences among individuals
on the whole. 2 Coexisting with this appreciation of differences is a
long history of the use of language as a tool of subjugation. This
springs largely from the majority's fear of domination by the very
minority groups that comprise our valued diversity. 3 English-only
rules in the workplace are a recent example of this tension between
viewing multicultural characteristics as strengths and simultaneously
feeling compelled to dominate expressions of minority characteristics.
1. See generally, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution
and Cultural Identity, 64 N. C.L. REv. 303 (1986) (exploring the struggle between
America's history of multiculturalism and the compulsion of the majority to
dominate cultural minorities). Karst includes a section on language as both defining
a cultural group and also providing a vehicle for discrimination. Id. at 351-58. See
also Stephen M. Cutler, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims Under
Title VII, 94 YALE L.J. 1164, 1179 (1985) ("Of course, this pluralistic vision clashes
with the pervasive image of the American melting pot.") The melting pot "envisions
the assimilation of all newcomers into a singular American identity, from which
cultural and ethnic differences have disappeared." Id. "A tension between the two
ideas-cultural pluralism on the one hand and assimilation on the other-is an
inevitable outgrowth of the integrative efforts of a minority ethnic group that seeks
also to preserve its distinct cultural identity." Id.
2. See Karst, supra note 1, at 377. See also Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of the Se.
Judicial Dist., Los Angeles County, 838 F.2d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing
Karst, supra note 1, at 361-69, 376-77).
3. See generally Mark L. Adams, Fear of Foreigners: Nativism and Workplace
Language Restrictions, 74 OR. L. REv. 849 (1995) (providing a history of language
in America and presenting examples of attempts to dominate minority groups
through language restrictions, including the movement for official English and
English-only workplace rules).
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This Comment compares the current U.S. approach to English-
only rules 4 to the European Union (EU) approach to workplace
language discrimination and offers the EU method as a model
framework which the United States should use to improve and
modernize its approach. In the United States, language has yet to
attain the status of a protected class under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act,5 although a compelling argument has been made for language
inclusion under the protected class of national origin. 6 In contrast, the
European Union expressly protects language from discrimination and
defines language as it does race or sex, as a class of its own.7
Part I of this Comment presents an overview of the nature of
English-only rules and outlines the basic law governing English-only
workplace rules in the United States: namely, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.8 Part II compares four areas in which the U.S. law and the
EU law diverge in both theory and application of the law to language
restrictions in the workplace: (1) the view of language as a
characteristic protected from discrimination, (2) the types of claims
allowed in challenging English-only rules, (3) the burdens of proof in
the United States and the European Union, and (4) the arguable
mutability of language as disqualifying it from protection. Presenting
these U.S. issues in contrast with those of the European Union shows
that the European Union provides a framework that can more
adequately address language discrimination. Finally, Part III details
the full framework of the EU approach to language generally and
language restrictions in the workplace. Through this more in-depth
4. An "English-only rule" is a workplace rule that requires employees speak
only English either all of the time or part of the time. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2007).
5. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2a (West 2007).
6. See, e.g., Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir. 2006);
Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036-38; EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F.
Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (N.D. Tex. 2000); EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 911, 911-12 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
7. "[Tlhe term 'racism' should be understood in a broad sense . . . these
concepts, which vary over time, nowadays cover.., race, colour, religion, language,
nationality and national and ethnic origin." European Comm'n Against Racism &
Intolerance, ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 7: National Legislation to
Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination 12 (2002) [hereinafter The
Recommendation], available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human-rights/ecri/4-
Publications/ (follow "RECOMMEN- DATION N* 7" hyperlink).
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2007).
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examination of recent EU language discrimination legislation, it is
apparent that the European Union views multilingualism in the
workplace as a strength,9 much to its benefit in a global world. Part
III then argues that the EU approach is a model framework which the
United States should consider in settling the still unresolved issue of
U.S. English-only rules. '0
I. U.S. LAW ON ENGLISH-ONLY WORKPLACE RULES
A. What is an English-Only Rule?
An English-only rule is a rule made by an employer that restricts
the employees' use of any language other than English while at
work. 1   The rules can vary in their effect upon an employee
depending upon the scope of the rule and the employee's proficiency
in English. 1 2 For example, some English-only rules prohibit the use of
other languages while the employee engages in specific tasks, such as
interacting with customers or speaking in areas where customers are
often present.' 3 On the other hand, some rules require an employee
9. See, e.g., The Official Site of the European Union, Language Learning,
http://europa.eu/languages/en/chapter/l4 (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). "The European
Union actively encourages its citizens to learn other European languages, both for
reasons of professional and personal mobility .. " Id. See also The Official Site
of the European Union, Linguistic Diversity: Policies, http://europa.eu/
languages/en/chapter/18 (last visited Dec. 1, 2007). "[Tlhe Commission has set a
target of "Mother tongue-plus-two" for its policy on language skills." Id.
10. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether English-only rules
discriminate based on national origin. See Mun. Ct. of the Se. Judicial Dist., County
of Los Angeles v. Gutierrez, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Gutierrez, but the appeal was dismissed as moot. Id.
11. E.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980). Employees were
permitted to speak Spanish while on the sales floor only when assisting a Spanish-
speaking customer. Id. The employees were not permitted to speak Spanish to each
other while on the sales floor, regardless of the primary languages of the employees.
Id. Spanish was permitted to be spoken in parts of the store which customers did not
routinely visit. Id.
12. Compare Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (fully bilingual employees), with EEOC v.
Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 912 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (employees with
varying degrees of English proficiency).
13. See Gloor 618 F.2d at 266 (reviewing a rule allowing employees to speak
Spanish at all times, except while on the sales floor, at which time English is the
only permitted language). The rule did not apply during breaks or in places where
2007] 219
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speak only English at all times, including in personal conversations,
while on breaks, and during phone conversations with family
members. 14
In some instances, the employer specifically requires or prefers
bilingual proficiency and subsequently enacts English-only rules. 5
This contradictory behavior especially blurs any rationale behind the
rules. In EEOC v. Premier Operator Services,' 6 for example, the
employer recruited and hired "based or conditioned upon [an
applicant's] bilingual ability" and viewed the ability to speak Spanish
as "an asset in conducting its business."17 Subsequently, however, the
employer enacted an English-only rule of the most comprehensive
nature.' 8 The rule required employees to speak only English at all
times (except when assisting a Spanish-speaking customer) including
during breaks, lunch hours, during free time, and during personal
telephone calls. 19 Equally perplexing is the employer who does not
require English speaking ability or even English comprehension as a
job requirement and subsequently enacts an English-only rule which
requires the use of only English for employees who speak no English
at all. 20
customers did not regularly visit. Id. Most of the employees in Gloor were
bilingual, but some spoke no English at all. Id. Garcia was discharged for violating
the English-only rule when a Spanish-speaking employee asked Garcia for an item,
and Garcia replied to the co-worker in Spanish while on the sales floor. Id.
14. See, e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066
(N.D. Tex. 2000). Bilingual employees were not permitted to use anything but
English at all times while at work, except when assisting a Spanish-speaking
customer. Id. at 1069. The rule applied during breaks and during phone calls home.
Id. The employer "admits that it went as far as to plan installation of a public
telephone outside of the building, so that Hispanic employees would have to go
outside to make personal phone calls during which they might speak Spanish." Id.
15. E.g., Velasquez v. Goldwater Memorial Hospital, 88 F. Supp. 2d 257, 260
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066,
1068 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
16. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1068.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 1069.
19. Id.
20. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993). The
company never required either the speaking or comprehension of English of its
employees as a condition of employment but enacted an English-only rule when
monolingual English speakers complained that Spanish was being used to harass
4
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In Maldonado v. City of Altus, 2' a Hispanic employee commented
on the employer's English-only policy, illustrating the constant
pressure a bilingual speaker might experience when subject to such a
rule:
The English-only policy affects my work everyday. It reminds me
every day that I am second-class and subject to rules for my
employment that the Anglo employees are not subject to. I feel that
this rule is hanging over my head and can be used against me at any
point when the city wants to have something to write me [up] for.2
B. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal to
discriminate in the workplace based upon race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.23 The statute provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer . . .to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.24
It is not insignificant that the language of Title VII goes beyond
what could be considered ordinary workplace discrimination; that is,
the refusal to hire or promote an individual on the basis of some
characteristic. 25  Instead, Title VII goes further to designate other
them. Id. The company allowed an exception to the English-only rule for at least
one employee who spoke only Spanish. Id.
21. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir. 2006).
22. Id. at 1301.
23. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2a (West 2007).
24. Id.
25. The language of Title VII also prohibits anything that "limit[s],
segregate[s], or classif[ies] ... employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
2007]
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kinds of treatment as discriminatory, including a "segregation or
classification" of an employee, and the "terms, conditions or
privileges" of employment. 26 This is especially relevant in English-
only cases because in most instances these more subtle changes in
employment take place when individuals are subject to the rules. 27
English-only rules generally have been challenged in an
employment discrimination context under Title VII's protected class
of national origin, 28 but claims are also cognizable under the protected
class of race,29 under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, section 1981,30 and
as Constitutional violations. 31  Generally, the allegation from
employees subject to English-only rules is that compliance is more
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee .... 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
2a(2) (West 2007).
26. Id. In Spun Steak, the court stated in regards to an English-only case that it
was "satisfied that a disparate impact claim may be based upon a challenge to a
practice or policy that has a significant adverse impact on the 'terms, conditions, or
privileges' of the employment of a protected group ...." 998 F.2d 1480, 1485-86
(9th Cir. 1993).
27. "The conditions of work encompass the workplace atmosphere as well as
the more tangible elements of the job." Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294,
1303 (10th Cir. 2006). "Plaintiffs allege that the defendant... ha[s] discriminated
against . . . them on the basis of their national origin with respect to the terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment, and created a hostile work
environment .. " Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 939 (E.D.
Va. 1995). One of the most recent English-only cases, Maldonado v. City of Altus,
went so far as to recognize that the mere existence of an English-only policy in itself
may negatively affect the conditions of employment in a discriminatory way,
regardless of whether the actual effects in a particular employment setting are felt by
a protected class. 433 F.3d 1294, 1304-05 (10th Cir. 2006).
28. E.g., Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1298; Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d
1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993); Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of the Se. Judicial Dist., Los
Angeles County, 838 F.2d. 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1988); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.,
813 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1987); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir.
1980); EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1068 (N.D.
Tex. 2000); Velasquez v. Goldwater Mem'l Hosp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 257, 259
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); EEOC v. Synchro Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 91 1(N.D.
Ill. 1999).
29. E.g., Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1298; Gutierrez 838 F.2d at 1036.
30. E.g., Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1298; Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036; Jurado,
813 F.2d. at 1408; Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 937 (E.D.
Va. 1995).
31. E.g., Maldonado, 433 F.2d. at 1036; Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036.
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difficult for bilingual employees than it is for a monolingual English
speaker, and therefore, the bilingual worker will run a higher risk of
exposure to the employer's disciplinary measures for breaking the
rule. 32 The ability to speak a language other than English often exists
because an individual is born, or has ancestors that were born, outside
this country.33  Therefore, according to the argument for including
language as an aspect of national origin, the heavier burden
experienced by the non-native English speaker is due to his or her
national origin.
34
32. See, e.g., Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1068. In EEOC v.
Premier Operator Services, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) charged, and the court agreed, that workers whose primary language was
Spanish were discriminated against under the disparate impact analysis because
"employees at Premier who did not speak Spanish, and who were not of Hispanic
national origin, were not subject to the same oppressive monitoring or potential
discipline and discharge as were the Hispanic employees." Id. at 1075. In Garcia v.
Gloor, the court described the plaintiffs' argument, stating "that the rule is
discriminatory in impact, even if that result was not intentional, because it was likely
to be violated only by Hispanic-Americans and that, therefore, they have a higher
risk of incurring penalties." Gloor, 618 F. 2d at 270.
33. Or, it at least is a likely corollary. Census information for 2005 shows that
of the 35,689,842 foreign born individuals in America, 84.1% have the ability to
speak another language or speak another language in the home. U.S. Census
Bureau, Characteristics of a Foreign Born Population, (2006), www.census.gov
(follow "American Fact Finder" hyperlink; then follow "People" hyperlink; then
follow "Origins and Language" hyperlink; then follow "Characteristics of Foreign
Born Population" hyperlink) [hereinafter Census Information]. It is difficult to
imagine a condition that contributes more to determining what an individual's first
and primary language will be than one's national origin. It is arguable that the
language spoken in the home could be a stronger determinative factor of first
language, but this condition is determined by one's ancestors' national origin, and so
origin is still implicated here. To address this, the EEOC includes in its guidelines
that one's "ancestors"' place of national origin should be included in determining an
employee's national origin. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2007).
34. Some of the most compelling evidence for the existence of a burden for
non-native English speakers comes out of the psycho-linguistic research presented in
EEOC v. Premier Operator Services, Inc. See EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs.,
113 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; infra Part lI.D.
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II. A COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. Should Language Rules be Interpreted as Discrimination
Based on National Origin?
1. The U.S. Approach
Central to the issue of Title VII application in the English-only
context is whether language should be considered a characteristic that
reflects national origin in a way that requires protection.35 The
legislative history on the meaning of national origin is scant,36 but
arguments have been made, even before the first English-only case
was decided, that language is an integral part of national origin.37
Domestic courts 38  and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) have defined national origin in two different
ways, and courts defer to the guidelines to varying degrees, leaving
35. "Language" is not expressly stated as a protected characteristic under Title
VII. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2007). The EEOC guidelines help plaintiffs
argue that language should be considered integral to national origin because the
guidelines expressly categorize "linguistic characteristics" as a protected
characteristic of national origin. 29 C.F.R. §1606.1 (2007). See generally Mark
Colon, Line Drawing, Code Switching, and Spanish as Second-Hand Smoke:
English-Only Workplace Rules and Bilingual Employees, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
227, 246-49 (2002) (arguing that language does implicate national origin).
36. See generally, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating
"National Origin" Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805,
817-22 (1994) (discussing the problem of scant legislative history on the term
national origin in Title VII).
37. "[L]anguage is more likely than most symbols of ethnicity to become the
symbol of ethnicity. [I]t is the recorder of paternity, expresser of patrimony and the
carrier of phenomenology. Any vehicle carrying such precious freight must come to
be viewed equally precious.., in and of itself." James Leonard, Bilingualism and
Equality: Title VII Claims for Language Discrimination in the Workplace, 38 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 127 (2004) (citing Joshua A. Fishman, Language and
Ethnicity, in LANGUAGE, ETHNICITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS, 15, 25 (Howard
Giles ed., 1977)).
38. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether national origin should
encompass language. See generally Rosanna McCalips, What Recent Court Cases
Indicate about English-Only Rules in the Workplace: A Critical Look at the Need for
a Supreme Court Ruling on the Issue, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 417, 432-38 (2002)
(discussing the Supreme Court's dictum addressing the English-only rules).
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much confusion in finding what national origin means, and more
importantly, what it should mean.39
The most quoted judicial definition of national origin is provided
in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc.,40 in which the U. S.
Supreme Court used a plain language interpretation of Title VII to
define national origin merely as "refer[ing] to the country where a
person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her
ancestors came."41 On the other hand, the EEOC, as the governing
administrative body for Title VII, 42 has interpreted national origin in a
much different way than have the courts.43
The EEOC has set out two important guidelines in interpreting
English-only rules: the definition of national origin 44 and the
presumption of discrimination guideline.45  The EEOC defines
national origin as "including, but not limited to, the denial of equal
39. The different definitions create confusion because the EEOC guidelines are
"entitled to great deference." 42 U.S.C.A.§ 2000e-12(15) (West 2007). But, courts
have found ways to refuse deference. The Court in Spun Steak refused to defer to
the EEOC guidelines when the employees in the case were bilingual. Garcia v.
Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487-89 (9th Cir. 1993). Also, some courts in
English-only cases have specifically proscribed deference to the guidelines. E.g.,
EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (N.D. Tex.
2000); EEOC v. Synchro Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 912 (N.D. 111. 1999).
Further, the United States Supreme Court has proscribed deference to EEOC
guidelines in other kinds of employment discrimination cases, for example in Griggs
v. Duke Power Company, but has yet to rule whether deference is required in the
specific case of an English-only employment discrimination case. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
40. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
41. Id. at 88. In Espinoza, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII does not
protect against discrimination on the basis of citizenship. Id. In so doing, the
Supreme Court established this definition of national origin to distinguish it from
one's citizenship. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-4(g)(5) (West 2007); 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-12(a) (West
2007).
43. See generally, e.g., Perea, supra note 36, at 821-32 (comparing different
courts' interpretation of "national origin"); Amy Crowe, May I Speak? Issues Raised
by Employer's English-Only Policies, 30 J. CORP. L. 593, 598-602 (2005) (providing
an analysis of decisions in which courts have or have not deferred to the EEOC
guidelines). See generally, e.g., Mark L. Adams, supra note 3, at 889-96 (discussing
two important federal circuit cases ruling on English-only issues).
44. 29 C.F.R. §1606.1 (2007).
45. Id. § 1606.7.
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employment opportunity, because of an individual's, or his or her
ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical,
cultural, or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group. "46
This definition's import is clearly in contrast with the Supreme
Court's definition; it expressly states language as a protected
characteristic, while the Supreme Court's definition makes no mention
of language.47
Secondly, the EEOC has issued specific guidelines interpreting
when English-only rules should be presumed discriminatory,48
distinguishing English-only rules that are applied at all times and
those applied only part of the time.49 Employment practices that
require employees to speak English at all times while at work are
presumed to be discriminatory because the rule "disadvantages an
individual's employment opportunities on the basis of national
origin," 50 and "may also create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation
and intimidation based on national origin which could result in a
discriminatory working environment."'" In the case of an English-
only rule applied only at certain times, the EEOC requires a business
necessity to justify the rule in order to escape liability for
discrimination.52 If the courts uniformly deferred to these guidelines,
interpretation of language as implicating national origin would be easy
to resolve. 53 Unfortunately, however, the courts do not always give
deference to the guidelines, which has created confusing and non-
uniform results. 54
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2007).
47. Id.; Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973).
48. 29 C.F.R. §1606.7 (2007).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. In cases where the rule applies at all times, the plaintiff only needs to show
the existence of the rule to meet his burden of proof, as a rule applied at all times is
presumed discriminatory. 29 C.F.R. §1606.7(a) (2007). When the rule is applied
only part of the time, the employer is still required to show a business necessity to
prevail. 29 C.F.R. §1606.7(b) (2007). So, in either case, the plaintiff only needs to
show the existence of the rule to meet his burden of proof. Id.
54. Compare Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489-91 (9th Cir.
1993) (rejecting the EEOC guidelines and finding the plaintiffs had not made out a
10
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The reasons courts give for rejecting the EEOC guidelines are not
compelling and should be abandoned in favor of deference to the
guidelines. 55 In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,56 the court defended its
rejection of the guidelines by relying on Espinoza v. Farah
Manufacturing Co., Inc.,57 in which the Supreme Court refused to
defer to EEOC guidelines 58 because of "compelling indications that it
is wrong," based on interpretation of the congressional record of Title
VII. 59 The court in Spun Steak, also relying on congressional records,
rejected the EEOC guidelines based on a finding that the Title VII
congressional record lacked indication that there should be any
presumptions of discrimination in disparate impact cases in general
and that the record further lacked any discussion of English-only rules
at all.6°
prima facie case for discrimination) with EEOC v. Synchro Start Prods., Inc., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 911, 912 (N.D. I11. 1999) (finding the guidelines persuasive and that a valid
Title VII claim had been made) and EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F.
Supp. 2d 1066, 1073-75 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (deferring to the guidelines and finding
that the defendants' employees who were not of Hispanic origin were not subject to
the same potential discipline as employees who were of Hispanic origin). See
generally Theodore W. Wern, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the
Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 1533 (1999) (discussing different models of deference afforded the
EEOC in Title VII and providing other types of cases in which the EEOC has been
given authority to issue guidelines). Wern shows that, even historically, the level of
deference required to be given to the EEOC has been unclear. Id. at 1552-56.
55. For an argument in favor of deference to the EEOC guidelines, see
generally, for example, Colon, supra note 35, at 256-60.
56. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487-89. Spun Steak is one of two appellate court
cases deciding the discriminatory effect of an English-only rule. The only other
case, Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (1980), was decided before the English-only
guidelines were enacted by the EEOC.
57. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
58. The court in Farah refused to defer to the guidelines in order to rule that a
person's "citizenship" and a person's "national origin" are not synonymous in the
employment discrimination context. Id. at 93-94. The Court found that nothing in
the congressional record of Title VII supported equating "national origin" with
"citizenship," and so refusal to defer was appropriate. Id. The Court ultimately
ruled that workplace discrimination based on citizenship is not discrimination that
falls under the protection of Title VII. Id.
59. Id.
60. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489-90.
2007]
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This is not a compelling argument for two reasons. First,
concepts of national origin are not static, they change with the times,61
and it is likely that Congress had not considered the effect of an
English-only rule, since the issue of English-only rules had not
received much attention, if any at all.62 A lack of discussion on a
subject cannot show intent of any sort when the issue had not yet been
raised in a Title VII context.63 Second, the Supreme Court has stated,
in interpretation of administrative agency authority generally, that
when "Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are
given controlling weight unless arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute., 64  Therefore, since Congress has left this
"gap" in addressing English-only rules, the EEOC should have the
authority to enact regulations that are given deference on the subject
of English-only rules. 65  Further, Congress expressly addressed the
effectiveness of the guidelines in legislative debate for the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, but did not make changes to them, therefore
impliedly accepting the EEOC guidelines.66 In the face of these
61. Crowe, supra note 43, at 604.
62. See generally Perea, supra note 36, at 817-22 (showing there is scant
record of any discussion on national origin claims in general, much less any
discussion on English-only rules). Title VII was enacted in 1964. 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e (West 2007). Garcia v. Gloor, the first appellate case dealing with English-
only rules, was not heard until 1980. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
63. "It would be impossible for Congress to predict the multitude of
discriminatory policies that employers might adopt and the many protected groups
that these policies might adversely affect." Crowe, supra note 43, at 604.
64. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-
44 (1984).
65. See id.
66. The legislative debate included the following:
Mr. DeConcini: These regulations reflect the fact that the primary
language of an individual is often an essential national origin
characteristic. Does the Senator agree that these regulations found
in 29 C.F.R. 16067.7 [sic] provide a sound and effective method
for dealing with this problem? Mr. Kennedy: Yes, I agree that this
regulation has worked well during the past 11 years it has been in
effect. Mr. DeConcini: Does the substitute to S. 1745 in any way
adversely affect the EEOC regulation on language use in the
workplace. Mr. Kennedy: No, it does not. Mr. DeConcini:
12
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compelling reasons to defer to the EEOC's guidelines, it is evident
that rejection of them is inappropriate. 67
The EEOC's definition includes more characteristics, specifically
language, 68 into the class of national origin than does the definition
given in Espinoza, indicating that the EEOC considers language to be
entwined closely with one's national origin. 69 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court's definition looks solely to the geographical location
of one's birth to determine national origin and fails to make any
connection between characteristics that contribute to one's national
origin and the geographical location of one's birth.70 Therefore, the
question becomes whether the traits to be protected from
discrimination, or, more importantly, the traits which should be
protected from discrimination, are culturally based characteristics such
as language or merely such traits as the geographic location of one's
place of birth.7'
Therefore, if S. 1745 is passed and signed into law by the
President, the EEOC regulations would be consistent with [Tlitle
VII as amended by S. 1745. Mr. Kennedy: That is correct.
137 CONG. REc. 15,489 (1991), quoted in Leonard, supra note 37, at 105-06.
67. The EEOC guidelines should be followed unless some court can find the
EEOC guidelines to be "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. It is clear that the guidelines could not reasonably be
interpreted to be any of these things, as they are in line with the goal of Title VII. 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2007). Congress "considered the policy against
discrimination to be of the 'highest priority,"' so guidelines that help to end
discrimination by lightening a plaintiff's burden in a discrimination case comport
with congressional intent. Crowe, supra note 43, at 604.
68. 29 C.F.R. §1606.1 (2007).
69. Id.
70. E.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973). See also
Perea, supra note 36, at 823-25 (characterizing Farah's definition as "overly-
narrow" and "pro-assimilation," and postulating that one of the problems with the
definition is that it is the only one handed down from the Supreme Court in thirty
years).
71. It seems that Title VII attempts to protect cultural characteristics, but its
interpretation fails at meeting this end. See generally Perea, supra note 36, at 809-
10. Perea discusses the inadequacy of Title VII in protecting against discrimination
due to ethnically-related traits. Id. Perea also discusses the problem of scant
legislative history on the definition of national origin. Id. at 817-23. See generally
Eugenio Abellera Cruz, Unprotected Identities: Recognizing Cultural Ethnic
Divergence in Interpreting Title VII's 'National Origin' Classification, 9 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 161 (1998) (arguing that defining national origin based solely on
2007] 229
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2. Why Consider the EU Approach?
Consideration of the EU approach could help guide this
discrepancy in the direction of language inclusion under national
origin as the European Union views language as a characteristic that
should be protected from discrimination. The European Union has an
official policy of multilingualism, encouraging individuals to learn
multiple languages for the purpose of professional use.72
Complementing this policy are express provisions in both the
European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights 73 and The
Recommendation on National Legislation to Combat Racism and
Racial Discrimination 74 that expressly name "language" as its own
specifically protected class.75 With these in place, the European
Union can see past the arbitrary limitation of geography of national
origin and view language in itself as a characteristic of an individual
that deserves protection from discrimination.76
B. Types of Claims Brought for Workplace Discrimination in the
United States and the European Union
1. U.S. Claims
In the United States, there are two types of claims that can be
brought against an employer for discrimination: disparate treatment
claims and disparate impact claims.77 Disparate treatment claims
one's geographical history does not reflect ethnicity and that national origin should
be interpreted to incorporate cultural attributes).
72. The Official Site of the European Union, http://europa.eu/
languages/en/home (last visited Sept. 13, 2007); The Official Site of the European
Union, Language Learning, http://europa.eu/languages/en/chapter/14 (last visited
Nov. 4, 2007).
73. Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Eur. Parl.-Council
of Eur. Union-Eur. Comm'n, Dec. 18, 2000, art. 21, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, art. 21
[hereinafter Charter on Fundamental Rights].
74. The Recommendation, supra note 7, § I(l)(b).
75. Id.; Charter on Fundamental Rights, supra note 73.
76. See id.
77. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) ("[Title VII]
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation."); see, e.g., Wilson v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 517 F. Supp.
14
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require the plaintiff to prove that the employer had the actual intent to
discriminate against the employee on the basis of one of the protected
classes under Title VII. 78  For example, in Wilson v. Southwest
Airlines, Co.,79 the employer airline enacted a policy that only females
would be hired for the position of flight attendant. 80  This policy is
considered one of disparate treatment because "gender" is an
expressly protected class, 81 and the employer's policy explicitly and
intentionally speaks to excluding one gender from an employment
opportunity.
82
On the other hand, employees claiming national origin
discrimination for English-only rules usually bring their Title VII
claims under the disparate impact theory. 83 In a disparate impact case,
the employer's policy is facially neutral; that is, it does not explicitly
292, 293 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (finding disparate treatment in intentional discriminatory
employment policies when defendant purposely discriminated against males in the
hiring of flight attendants).
78. Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 1985).
79. Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
80. Id. at 293. In fact, Southwest conceded that its policy intentionally
excluded males. Id. The issue in Wilson was whether Southwest's policy qualified
as a "bona fide occupational qualification" [BFOQ] defense, which would have the
effect of allowing the employer to continue its discriminatory practice. Id. The
court in Wilson ruled that being female was not a BFOQ for the position of flight
attendant, since much of the reasoning that Southwest provided in arguing for its
female-only policy was based on Southwest's postulated customer preference, and
Southwest could show no proof that revenue loss would actually result from hiring
males. Id. at 304.
81. 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-2a (West 2007).
82. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 293.
83. E.g., Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of the Se. Judicial Dist., Los Angeles County,
838 F.2d 1031, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1988). The court in Gutierrez reasoned that
plaintiffs had established a "likelihood of success" on a disparate impact claim. Id.
at 1045; see also Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993)
(disparate impact claims even when the discrimination is not a result of intentional
discrimination). But see Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir.
2006) (disparate impact and disparate treatment claims challenging an English-only
rule); Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 939-42 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(disparate treatment and disparate impact claims challenging an English-only rule);
Raechel L. Adams, English-Only in the Workplace: A New Judicial Lens Will
Provide More Comprehensive Title VII Protection, 47 CATH. U.L. REv. 1327, 1360-
62 (1998). Adams argues that both disparate impact and disparate treatment can be
useful in analyzing English-only claims. Id.
15
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name or apply to a protected class. 84 But, when the practice is applied
to the facially neutral characteristic, it has the effect of impacting a
protected class in a more negative, disparate way, even when applied
uniformly to all employees. 85  English-only rules do not explicitly
apply to the protected class of national origin, but they apply to
language which is a characteristic that correlates in a special way with
national origin. 86  It is more difficult for people born outside the
United States, who speak a language in addition to English, to comply
with an English-only rule than it is for people born in the United
States who speak only English.87 Therefore, these rules impact a high
percentage of individuals whose national origins are other than
American 88 in a disparate way even though the rule is applied to every
worker in the same manner. 89 Since language is not a protected class,
84. "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination, but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
85. "While English-only rules may be seen as facially neutral, they
disproportionately burden national origin minorities because they preclude many
members of these groups from speaking the language in which they are best able to
communicate, while rarely, if ever, having that effect on non-minority employees."
EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (N.D. Tex.
2000).
86. See Census Information, supra note 33.
87. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. Expert witness
testimony provided that bilingual individuals unconsciously switch between
languages, and at times it may be impossible to control this phenomenon. Id.
Therefore, a person who is bilingual will be at risk for this uncontrollable lapsing
into his first language, while the English speaker is at no such risk. Id. This poses
an additional risk for bilingual employees but not monolingual English speakers. Id.
88. See Census Information, supra note 33.
89. Id. It is important to emphasize that there must be a correlation between
the characteristic (if it is not one explicitly stated in Title VII) and a protected class
for an argument to be made that the characteristic should be protected. Id. For
example, if an employer required its employees to be able to lift fifty pounds, the
employees who could not lift the weight would not have a disparate impact claim
unless their weakness correlated with being a member of a protected class.
"Weakness," in itself, is not a protected characteristic, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)
(West 2007), and so the employees would have to show a correlation between being
weaker and being a member of a protected class (female, for example). This kind of
corollary showing is illustrated in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977),
where the female plaintiff did not meet the minimum height and weight
requirements for a correctional counselor trainee position. 433 U.S. at 323. The
16
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a court must accept this correlation for a plaintiff to prevail, and thus,
there is an extra step of convincing the court of the correlation for a
prima facie case of discrimination.
90
2. EU Claims
In contrast to the U.S. approach, the EU approach allows a
plaintiff to easily bring a claim for an English-only rule under either
theory.9' This broadens a plaintiffs options and removes the
requirement of a correlation argument, thereby lightening the
plaintiff's burden.92  The European Union's statutory framework
defines direct discrimination as "any differential treatment based on a
ground such as race, colour, [or] language." 93  Since language as a
protected class appears directly in the EU direct discrimination
framework, the plaintiff is relieved of the extra step of arguing a
plaintiff made a statistical showing that the requirements had a significant effect of
excluding females at a higher rate than males. Id. at 329-30. Therefore, the
requirement was determined to be sex discrimination based on the correlation of the
requirement and the protected class of sex. Id. at 331.
90. The correlation between national origin and language must be argued in
order to make a claim under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2a (West 2007). In
fact, since language in itself is not included as a protected class, "scholars and
advocates must always argue that traits such as accent and language are highly
correlated with different national origins and therefore merit protection under Title
VII." Perea, supra note 36, at 851; Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The
Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 761
(1993).
91. The European Union names the two types of discrimination "direct" and
"indirect" discrimination. Council Directive 2000/43, art. 2, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22
(EC) [hereinafter The Race Directive]. Domestic courts name the two types
"disparate treatment," which is similar to the European Union's "direct"
discrimination and "disparate impact," which is similar to the European Union's
"indirect" discrimination. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
92. The European Union's direct discrimination statutory framework states that
a claim can be brought when "one person is treated less favourably than another
is .. . ." The Race Directive, supra note 91. This broad language, combined with
The Recommendation's inclusion of "language" explicitly as a protected class,
indicates that a plaintiff in an English-only case could bring a cause of action for
direct discrimination if a policy was enacted that addressed language. The
Recommendation, supra note 7, § II(b).
93. The Recommendation, supra note 7, § 11(b).
2007] 233
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correlation between language and a protected class. 94 The explicit
recognition of language as a protected class indicates that the
European Union considers language by itself a defining characteristic
of an individual.
C. Differences in the Burdens of Proof
1. The U.S. Scheme
The burden of proof scheme requires the plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case of Title VII discrimination95 by showing a facially-
neutral employment practice that has a "significantly discriminatory"
impact on a group of employees protected under Title VII.96 This
showing of significantly discriminatory impact has proven to be a
difficult burden of proof for plaintiffs in English-only cases to meet
because it has traditionally required a showing of the disparate effect
of the employment policy in a statistically significant way.97 This a
difficult burden for plaintiffs in English-only cases to meet because
the employment cases are more often about discrimination that affects
94. This is especially relevant because Title VII protects other characteristics
that define a person, such as race or sex, but not language. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2a
(West 2007). The difference in approach reflects the two contrasting perspectives;
the U.S. has a perspective that language is not considered a defining characteristic,
and the European Union takes the opposite stance. See supra note 92. Strong
arguments have been made that would support the EU approach over the U.S.
approach. See, e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066,
1073 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Adams, supra note 3, at 903-07; Kiyoko Kamio Knapp,
Language Minorities: Forgotten Victims of Discrimination?, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
747, 766 (1997).
95. Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1131 (9th Cir. 1985).
96. Id.; Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447-48 (1982).
97. Title VII does not address any proportional disparity requirement. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2007). However, the EEOC has adopted, and the Supreme
Court has applied, an eighty percent rule to use in disparate impact cases. Teal, 457
U.S. 440, 444 n.4 (citing EEOC guidelines 29 CFR §1607.4(d) (1981)). They
"provide that a selection rate that is less than [eighty percent] of the rate for the
group with the highest rate will generally be regarded ... as evidence of adverse
impact." Id. The most recent appellate decision on English-only rules required this
statistical showing by the plaintiff. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486
(9th Cir. 1993).
18
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the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 98 rather than
discrimination which results in more concrete effects such as not
being promoted or hired for the job. While statistics regarding
concrete effects of discrimination are relatively easy to produce, 99 it is
more difficult to show the way a practice affects the more subtle
conditions of an individual's employment because these are subjective
aspects that do not easily lend themselves to statistical
quantification. 00 As acknowledged in Spun Steak,'0 ' "[w]hile such
statistics are often difficult to compile, whether the protected group
has been disadvantaged turns on quantifiable data [and] may depend
on subjective factors not easily quantified."' 1 2 Justice Boochever, in
his dissent in Spun Steak, disagreed with the court's requirement of
statistical proof of subjective factors. 103 He explained the difficulty of
proving impact:
[P]roof of such an effect of English-only rules requires analysis of
subjective factors. It is hard to envision how the burden of proving
such an effect would be met other than by conclusory self-serving
statements of the Spanish-speaking employees or possibly by expert
testimony of psychologists. The difficulty of meeting such a
burden may well have been one of the reasons for the promulgation
of the guideline. 1
04
98. E.g., Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of the Se. Judicial Dist., Los Angeles County,
838 F.2d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1988). "Gutierrez contends that the municipal court
rule constitutes racial and national origin discrimination with respect to a term or
condition of employment ..." Id. at 1036.
99. See, e.g., Teal, 457 U.S. at 444 (setting out the direct evidence which
showed that pass rates of various ethnic groups of a test establishing the pool of
applicants for promotions correlated with the test-takers' ethnicity).
100. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1486.
103. Id. at 1490 (Boochever, J., dissenting).
104. Id. The "guideline" to which Judge Boochever refers is the EEOC's
guideline that declares an English-only rule applied at all times to be presumptively
discriminatory. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2007). This presumption removes the need
for a statistical showing of disparity, thereby lightening the plaintiffs prima facie
burden of proof. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490. Courts, however, sometimes do not
defer to the guidelines, and the EEOC's attempt to alleviate the plaintiff's burden is
thus often unsuccessful. E.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489; Long v. First Union
2007] 235
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2. The EU Approach and a Possible U.S. Trend
The EU approach, on the other hand, is significantly more
plaintiff-friendly in the prima facie burden of proof stage because it
does not require a statistical showing of a discriminatory effect.'0 5 In
this way, the EU approach seems to reflect Judge Boochever's and the
EEOC's recognition that the process of presenting evidence of
discrimination does not easily lend itself to subjective factors affected
by English-only rules. 0 6 Plaintiffs in English-only cases have had
difficulty surviving the prima facie burden of proof stage, at least
partially because of this "exceedingly high" burden of proof in
showing discrimination in their "terms, conditions, and privileges" of
employment. 10 7  The EEOC guidelines"0 8 attempt to alleviate the
plaintiff s burden, and if given deference, would align the approach to
language rules with the EU approach in removing the necessity for
statistical evidence of disparity. In U.S. courts, however, varying
degrees of deference to the guidelines have produced mixed results in
actually alleviating the burden.' 09
Some more recent U.S. cases, however, seem to show that the
courts may be moving in the direction of recognizing English-only
rules as discriminatory, but the decisions provide a different rationale
for this recognition. 1"0 The criticism of English-only rules in these
Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 940 (E.D. Va. 1995). But see EEOC v. Premier
Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
105. See Elspeth Guild, The EC Directive on Race Discrimination: Surprises,
Possibilities and Limitations, 29 INDUS. L.J. 416, 420 (2000).
106. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2007); Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490.
107. Colon, supra note 35, at 256.
108. 29 C.F.R. §1606.7 (2007).
109. Compare Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1487-89 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting
the guidelines) with EEOC v. Synchro Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 912
(N.D. Ill. 1999) (deferring to the guidelines) and EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs.,
Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (emphasizing the need to defer to
the guidelines).
110. E.g., Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1075 ("Employees at
Premier who did not speak Spanish, and who were not of Hispanic national origin,
were not subject to the same oppressive monitoring or potential discipline and
discharge as were the Hispanic employees."); Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d
1294, 1305 (10th Cir. 2006) ("The policy itself, and not just the effect of the policy
in evoking hostility by co-workers, may create or contribute to the hostility of the
work environment.").
20
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cases as discriminatory is in response to psycho-linguistic studies
which show that language use in bilingual individuals is at least to
some extent out of the control of the speaker; that is, the language one
speaks is not a mutable characteristic."' This approach, if it becomes
a trend, would undoubtedly assist U.S. employees in their burden of
proof regarding English-only cases' 12 and align the U.S. approach
closer with that of the European Union, albeit on a different theory.' 13
However, if this approach does not become a trend, plaintiffs will
continue to face a difficult burden of proof in their establishment of a
prima facie case.
D. Should the Arguable Mutability of Language
Disqualify It From Protection?
1. The U.S. Employer's Mutability Argument
Although the plaintiff s burden of proof stage can be difficult, if it
is survived, the employer may still escape liability by showing a
business necessity for the English-only rule. 14 In order for a business
111. E.g., Crowe, supra note 43, at 600. This psycho-linguistic evidence,
showing that language use is not a matter of choice, was relied upon heavily by the
Premier Operator court in its ruling that the English-only rule set forth had a
disparate impact on bilingual employees. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d
at 1069.
112. In the two appellate court cases, each court, in order to hold no disparate
impact, relied on the theory that what language a bilingual employee speaks is
entirely a matter of choice. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980)
("Mr. Garcia was fully bilingual [and] [h]e chose deliberately to speak Spanish
instead of English .... ); Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487 (citing Gloor, 618 F.2d at
270) ("There is no disparate impact.., if the rule is one that the affected employee
can readily observe and nonobservance is a matter of individual preference."). If, as
in Premier Operator Services, evidence is presented showing bilingual employees
do not have a choice in language use, then the theory in Gloor and Garcia can be
successfully challenged by plaintiff employees. See Premier Operator Servs., 113
F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (2000).
113. If a trend were to develop, the United States would view language as a
protected class because it is not mutable. The European Union, however, protects
language as intrinsically valuable. See The Official Site of the European Union,
Language Learning (2006), http://europa.eu/languages/en/chapter/14 (last visited
Dec. 1, 2007).
114. In Gloor, the employer gave the following business justifications for the
firing of Garcia:
21
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necessity to relieve the employer of liability, the necessity identified
for the English-only rule must be that the speaking of only English is
either required for the employee to perform his or her job efficiently
or necessary for some safety-related reason. 5 It is clear that there are
important and legitimate reasons for an English-only rule which fall
within the parameters of an acceptable business necessity.1 6 These
legitimate reasons usually center on safety in the workplace or the
necessity of providing a particular service in the language of a
customer or customer base." 7 The validity of these kinds of business
justifications is not disputed here because, according to the Supreme
Court, they are "necessary to safe and efficient job performance." 118
These types of business justifications meet the test for a valid business
necessity and permit an employer to implement rules that may be
discriminatory in their impact." 9
English-speaking customers objected to the communications
between employees that they could not understand; pamphlets and
trade literature were in English, and were not available in Spanish
.... If employees.., were required to speak English on the job at
all times.., they would improve their English; and the rule would
permit supervisors, who did not speak Spanish, better to oversee
the work of subordinates.
Gloor, 618 F.2d at 267. The court found these reasons to be the motivation for
firing Garcia when he spoke Spanish while at work. Id.
115. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977).
116. For example, a rule requiring the use of only English while operating
heavy and dangerous machinery meets the test of a safety-oriented rule because all
employees must be able to understand communications in order to avoid injury. See
Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483 (explaining that non-Spanish speakers were distracted
by employees speaking Spanish while operating machinery).
117. E.g., Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1987)
(discussing how listeners of a radio station with a listener base of primarily English-
speakers were confused when the radio announcer spoke in Spanish). A customer
base of both monolingual English and monolingual Spanish speakers was a business
justification for allowing Spanish to be spoken only when speaking with Spanish
speaking customers. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266.
118. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331-32. In Dothard, a business necessity of
"strength" was rejected as a defense of a height and weight requirement for
employment as a correctional counselor because the employer could not show any
evidence correlating the requirements of height and weight with the necessity of
strength to be an effective counselor. Id.
119. Id.
22
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On the other hand, many reasons given by employers to defend
their English-only rules have fallen short of what is required of a
business necessity. 20 The veiled threat behind English-only rules is
that employers can set forth business necessities that appear to justify
the language restriction, when in reality the rule is a disguise for
intentional discrimination.' 21 Therefore, it is important to scrutinize
business necessities for legitimacy to avoid this effect.
Some employers defend their rule by arguing it does not burden
the employee whose first language is not English, provided the
employee is bilingual to some degree, because language is a mutable
characteristic; one may simply choose between speaking either
language. 22 However, this argument should not relieve employers of
120. The most often used business necessity is that English-only rules are
necessary for workplace harmony. Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of the Se. Judicial Dist.,
Los Angeles County, 838 F.2d 1031, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1988); Long v. First Union
Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 939 (E.D. Va. 1995); Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480,
1483. However, workplace harmony fails to satisfy either safety or efficiency-
related goals. "Even if there were evidence that a regulation mandating the use of
English during working hours would calm some employees' fears and thereby
reduce racial tension to some extent, this reason would not constitute a business
necessity .... Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1043. In some instances, courts have found
that an English-only rule enacted for the purpose of workplace harmony actually
increased tension and disharmony in the work environment. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Tex. 2000). "[T]he
evidence shows that the policy served to create a disruption in the work place and
feelings of alienation and inadequacy by Hispanic employees who had up to that
time been proven performers in the company." Premier Operator Servs., 113 F.
Supp. 2d at 1070. See generally Christina M. Rodriguez, Language Diversity in the
Workplace, 100 Nw. U.L. REv. 1689 (2006) (contending that rules that restrict
employees do not promote solidarity at all in the workplace and arguing that
workplace discrimination has a social impact as well as an individual one).
121. See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1038-39 (presenting Gutierrez's argument that
the English-only rule was a pretext for intentional discrimination). See also Knapp,
supra note 94, at 753 ("Employers may advance a seemingly credible business
necessity argument when, in fact, running deeper is the desire to discriminate on the
basis of national origin.").
122. E.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980); Garcia v. Spun
Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Colon, supra note 35, at
238-39 (explaining the mutability finding in Gloor); Rodriguez, supra note 120, at
1728-29 ("[B]ecause an employee (at least a nominally bilingual one) has control
over the language she speaks, an employer's rule prohibiting that employee from
speaking non-English does not fall within the category of employment practices
Congress intended Title VII to prohibit.").
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liability because the bilingual speaker still experiences a burden which
a monolingual English speaker does not. 123  This is because the
bilingual speaker always runs the risk of inadvertently slipping into
his native language, while the monolingual English speaker never runs
this risk. 24  This difference affects the individual's working
environment in a negative way because an employee's exposure to an
employer's discipline and reprimands for violations of the English-
only rule is more likely. 1
25
The court in Garcia v. Gloor first presented an example of this
defense emphasizing that the plaintiff was "fully bilingual."'' 26 He
chose deliberately to speak Spanish instead of English ....
However, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 128 the Supreme Court ruled that a
weight requirement that effectively disqualified a higher percentage of
female applicants from prison correctional counselor positions was
prohibitively discriminatory under Title VII. 129 Thus, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that a policy requiring a characteristic (albeit
mutable, and arguably at the discretion of the employee) that
correlated highly with a protected class, can be sufficient basis for
finding discrimination based on that protected class. 130
The same argument can be made for language and national
origin.131 Although one arguably has some control over language, 132
123. New evidence suggests that, at times, the language one speaks is outside
the conscious control of the speaker. EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F.
Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
124. Colon, supra note 35, at 250-51.
125. Premier Operator Services, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
126. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268.
127. Id. The Gloor court focuses on the element of choice in controlling one's
language, relying on language as a mutable characteristic. Id.
128. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977).
129. Id. at 329-31. The Court found that a height and weight requirement
excluded disproportionately more female applicants than male applicants and found
that these requirements (although the weight requirement is at least somewhat
mutable) were sufficiently discriminatory to bring a Title VII cause of action for the
protected class of sex. Id.
130. Id.
131. For further discussion on the argument that mutability does not exclude a
characteristic from qualification as a protected characteristic and more examples of
mutable characteristics that have been determined to have been the basis for
discrimination, see Aileen Maria Ugalde, "No Se Habla Espanol": English-Only
24
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bilingualism nevertheless correlates highly with the fact that a person
is of a national origin other than American. 133 Under a Dothard-type
analysis, this high correlation means that the mutability of language
does not disqualify it as a protected class of Title VII. 134 Instead,
since language correlates with national origin,' 35 a strong argument
can be made that language should be a protected characteristic of Title
VII, albeit a mutable one. 13 6 However, without a Supreme Court
decision on the issue, the mutability argument remains unsettled, and
with it, the application of Title VII to English-only rules overall.
2. Mutability: The EU Approach
The mutability problem does not exist in the EU approach because
both immutable and mutable characteristics are considered so
entwined with national origin to deserve protection from
discrimination. The European Union adopts a "distinct community"
test in deciding whether a characteristic should be considered part of
one's national origin.' 37 Under the test, an individual can show that
the characteristic in question is a defining trait of an ethnic group by
showing that the characteristic is common within the ethnic
community.1 38 It is unnecessary to account for the characteristic's
mutability in this test, and so it would not be relevant in determining
whether language should count as part of national origin.' 39  The
"distinct community" test, therefore, is less strict than the
immutability test used by some domestic courts.1 40 It is illustrative of
the expansiveness of the EU approach, which considers even mutable
characteristics that are shared with a defined group as so tied to
Rules in the Workplace, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1209, 1234-38 (1989).
132. For an argument that language is mutable and within the control of the
speaker, see generally Leonard, supra note 37, at 117-21. But see EEOC v. Premier
Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
133. See Census Information, supra note 33.
134. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1977).
135. Census Information, supra note 33.
136. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329-31.
137. Guild, supra note 105, at 418.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980).
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ethnicity or national origin to deserve protection from
discrimination. 14'
3. More Evidence on Mutability: Recent Psycho-Linguistic Findings
Recent psycho-linguistic information provides a strong argument
for the protection of language, relying on evidence that language is in
fact not wholly mutable. 142  This recent 143 psycho-linguistic
information presents a compelling argument that language is an
immutable characteristic over which the speaker, at least on some
level, has no control. 144 There are two new phenomena that present
evidence that language is outside the control of the speaker: "code
switching" and the "most recently spoken language phenomenon." 145
Code switching was first introduced into English-only cases in
EEOC v. Premier Operator Services, Inc., as a phenomenon wherein
individuals "unconsciously switch from English to their original or
primary language when speaking informally with fellow members of
their cultural group.' 146  Expert witness Susan Berk-Seligson' 47
testified that this switching between languages is not a matter of
choice for bilinguals and in some cases is "unconscious" and
"virtually impossible" to control. 48 So, English-only rules disparately
141. Under the EU approach, one could even see traveling communities as
deserving of protection from discrimination because one could identify a
characteristic (traveling) of a community of people that would trigger inclusion of
that characteristic under a group's ethnicities. Id. at 418.
142. The findings of the psycho-linguistic research were first presented in an
English-only context in EEOC v. Premier Operator Services, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d
1066, 1069-70 (N.D. Tex. 2000). See also Colon, supra note 35, at 224-47; Crowe,
supra note 43, at 602-03.
143. The psycho-linguistic research was done in the late 1990's after both
federal appellate court cases relied on the theory that language is within the control
of the speaker (Gloor and Spun Steak), and the research was presented in Premier
Operator Services in 2000. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
144. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d. at 1069-70; see also, e.g.,
Colon, supra note 35, at 224-56; McCalips, supra note 38, at 430-32 (explaining the
linguistic evidence presented in Premier Operator).
145. Id. at 431; Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-70.
146. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 21 at 1070.
147. Professor of Linguistics and Hispanic Language and Culture at the
University of Pittsburgh. Id. at 1069.
148. Id. at 1070.
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impact bilingual speakers because bilinguals are more likely to violate
the rule, 149 especially since in at least some situations, the ability to
control language is impossible.' 5 0
Code switching illustrates two things. First, language is not an
entirely mutable characteristic because it is often beyond the control
of the speaker.' 5 1 Second, an English-only rule does in fact
disparately impact those who primarily speak another language since
those people will be more likely to break the rule (at times without
any control over it) and therefore more likely subjected to
consequences imposed by the employer.' 52 In fact, since monolingual
English speakers run no risk of inadvertently slipping into another
language, not only are bilingual individuals more likely to break the
rule than monolingual English speakers, they bear the entire burden of
the rule. 153
The "most recently spoken language phenomenon"' 54 interplays
with code switching making it even more difficult for the bilingual
speaker to speak only English, and thus the speaker has even less
control over language choice. This phenomenon, also presented in
Premier Operator Services, describes how bilingual speakers "will
generally tend to continue to speak in the language in which they most
recently spoke."' 55 This is especially relevant in situations where
many bilingual employees work together and are permitted to speak in
their native language some of the time because conversation in their
first language can act as an "unconscious stimulus" to continue
speaking in that language. 156 The Premier Operator Services court
acknowledged the disadvantage the bilingual, Spanish-speaking
employee would have in a situation were he required to assist
customers in Spanish and then speak only English at all other times:
"There was no comparable risk posed by the policy for the
149. Colon, supra note 35, at 250-5 1.
150. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
151. Id.
152. Colon, supra note 35.
153. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; see also, e.g., Colon,
supra note 35, at 252.
154. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; see also, e.g., Colon,
supra note 35, at 250-5 1; McCalips, supra note 38, at 431.
155. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. at 1070.
156. Colon, supra note 35, at 250-51.
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defendant's non-Hispanic employees, particularly since they would
not have the same tendency to lapse into Spanish inadvertently.'
57
Finally, even if the above arguments are unconvincing, should
society ignore the importance of language to an individual because he
has the capacity to speak in another language? 158 Judge Reinhardt, in
his dissent from the denial of rehearing in Spun Steak, illustrated that
there remains an underlying reason for Title VII protection that does
not necessarily become irrelevant when an individual has the capacity
to comply with a particular rule:
Whether or not the employees can readily comply with a
discriminatory rule is by no means the measure of whether they
suffer significant adverse consequences. Some of the most
objectionably discriminatory rules are the least obtrusive in terms
of one's ability to comply; being required to sit in the back of a bus,
for example .... 159
Perhaps the import of language in itself, as recognized by the
European Union, is enough to require the protection of bilinguals'
right to be free of adverse consequences from language use in the
workplace. 6
0
157. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
158. See generally Leonard, supra note 37 (arguing that language is a mutable
characteristic). He acknowledges the validity of the code switching phenomenon,
but argues that enacting workplace language rules will change the unconscious
behavior of code switching in bilinguals. Id. at 122-23.
159. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 298 (1993) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
160. See generally Rodriguez, supra note 120 (arguing that the consequences
of English-only rules impact cultural community identities and that restricting
language use ultimately impacts cultural identity on a social level). Therefore, she
argues, the benefit that employers gain from the rules is outweighed by the social
costs paid by some communities. Id. at 1711-20.
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III. THE EU APPROACH AS A MODEL FRAMEWORK
TO LANGUAGE DISCRIMINATION
The European Union,161 along with other entities around the
globe,' 62 considers "language" as a category in itself deserving of
protection from discrimination.' 63 Of course, the European Union is a
different place than the United States in many ways. Particularly
relevant to this discussion is the multi-nationality of the European
Union as compared to the United States 164 and the express value the
European Union places on multilingualism.' 65  But, if fear of a
minority group's possible domination is the motivation behind our
English-only tendency, the European Union can serve as an example
of an organization of nations where many languages exist together
without domination. t66 The European Union is an organization in
161. Consisting of twenty-seven member states, the European Union is a
"unique supranational organization." ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW, INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS 1-1 (William L. Keller &
Timothy J. Darby, eds., BNA Books 2d ed. 2003); see also The Official Site of the
European Union, http://europa.eu/languages/en/home (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
162. Spain, Mexico, and South Africa each have enacted statutory protection
for language discrimination in the workplace. ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 161, at 6-73.
163. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states as
follows: "Any discrimination based on ... language... shall be prohibited." 2000
O.J. (C 364) 01. "Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, adopted by EU leaders in 2000, states that the Union shall respect linguistic
diversity, and Article 21 prohibits discrimination based on a number of grounds,
including language." The Official Site of European Union, Linguistic Diversity,
http://europa.eu/languages/en/chapter/5 (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
164. The European Union consists of twenty-seven member states. The
Official Site of the European Union, Linguistic Diversity (2007),
http://europa.eu/languages/en/home (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
165. The European Union works to promote language diversity and
implements official policies encouraging language diversity. E.g., COMM'N OF THE
EUROPEAN CMTYS, COMMISSION WORKING DOCUMENT, REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTION PLAN "PROMOTING LANGUAGE LEARNING AND
LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY" 4 (Sept. 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/education
/policies/lang/doc/com554_en.pdf (reporting a goal to build "language-friendly
environment"). The Commission of European Communities found that "the
promotion of language learning, linguistic diversity, and multilingualism as whole
have gained significantly in political importance." Id. at 5.
166. "It is [linguistic] diversity that makes the European Union what it is: not a
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which language diversity functions as a source of strength rather than
as a cause for fear.1
6 7
Two recent developments in EU anti-discrimination law are
especially relevant in this discussion: the Race Equality Directive' 68
(The Race Directive) and the General Policy Recommendation No. 7
on National Legislation to Combat Racism and Racial
Discrimination' 69 (The Recommendation). The European Union has
developed a vast array of other policies and legislation in recent
history with respect to discrimination. 70  These two pieces of
legislation, however, are the most relevant in a comparison with the
U.S. perspective on English-only rules in the workplace because both
indicate that discrimination, including that based on language, is
prohibited in the European Union.' 71
A. The Race Directive
The goal of The Race Directive is to provide a framework to fight
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, both in the
employment context and in society at large. 172 The Race Directive is
legally binding on all members of the European Union and establishes
'melting pot' in which differences are rendered down, but a place where diversity
can be celebrated as a source of wealth." The Official Site of the European Union,
Linguistic Diversity, http://europa.eu/languages/en/chapter/5 (last visited Nov. 4,
2007). In January 2007, Irish was added as the European Union's twenty-third
official language which requires EU institutions to translate legislation into many of
the official languages. European Commission, Irish Becomes European Union's 23rd
Official Language, Dec. 27, 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/news/culture/061227
1_en.htm.
167. "[L]earning languages opens doors. For individuals, it can open the door
to a better career .. . [flor companies, multilingual staff can open the door to
European and global markets." The Official Site of the European Union, Education
and Training, http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/languages-en.html.
168. The Race Directive, supra note 91.
169. The Recommendation, supra note 7.
170. See generally Dagmar Schiek, A New Framework on Equal Treatment of
Persons in EC Law?, 8 EUR. L.J. 290 (2002) (discussing the Framework Directive
and the Gender Equality Reform Directive policies).
171. Erica Howard, Anti Race Discrimination Measures in Europe: An Attack
on Two Fronts, 11 EUR. L.J. 468, 469 (2005).
172. The Race Directive, supra note 91, art. 1; see also Howard, supra note
171, at 470.
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a duty on each state to implement its own legislation to comply with
the anti-discrimination guidelines it provides. 173  This duty is not
taken lightly, as evidenced in 2004 when five member states failed to
enact sufficient legislation, and the European Commission
commenced litigation against them for failure to comply. 1
74
The Race Directive is similar to Title VII in that it provides the
framework for fighting workplace discrimination. 75 However, there
are two important differences between The Race Directive and Title
VII, both of which indicate that The Race Directive would deem the
U.S. English-only rules a prohibited form of discrimination. The first
is the "distinct community" approach to defining ethnic origin used by
the courts in interpreting The Race Directive. 176 The second is that
the burden of proof for a plaintiff under The Race Directive is less
severe than that of a plaintiff under Title VII, due to the influence of
The Recommendation, 77 which expressly includes language as its
own protected class. '
78
B. "Distinct Community" Test Under The Race Directive
The "distinct community" test adopted by the courts for defining
racial or ethnic origin under The Race Directive is much more flexible
than the immutable characteristic approach under Title VII. 179 Under
the "distinct community" test, an individual can identify his or her
173. Id. at 471.
174. Id. at 471 n.9.
175. See The Race Directive, supra note 91, arts. 1-4. Article 2 defines direct
and indirect discrimination (similar to disparate treatment and disparate impact
definitions in Title VII). Id. art. 2. Article 3 defines the scope of the provision,
including its application to the "working conditions" and "social advantages." Id.
art. 3. Article 4 provides a defense for "occupational requirements," similar to the
business justification defense of Title VII. Id. art. 4.
176. Guild, supra note 105, at 418 (referring to Mandla v. Dowell Lee, [1983]
2 AC 548).
177. Howard, supra note 171, at 486 (using either instrument to interpret the
other because both were promulgated by groups of which all Member States are
members).
178. "'[D]irect racial discrimination' shall mean any differential treatment
based on a ground such as race, colour, language ... " The Recommendation, supra
note 7, § I(1)(b).
179. Guild, supra note 105, at 418.
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ethnic group merely by showing that the group identified as his or her
community shares common characteristics, which may be within the
control of the individual. 180  For example, under the "distinct
community" test, a traveling community could identify "traveling" as
a characteristic that it shares with the members of its group, therefore
making it illegal to discriminate against them for being travelers, even
though the group has complete control over whether they continue to
travel or not.1 8 1  On the other hand, the immutable characteristic
approach to defining national origin used in some domestic courts
does not consider mutable characteristics, such as language or
traveling, as triggering protection under the class of national origin. 1
82
So, a plaintiff bringing a claim under The Race Directive for an
English-only rule would need only to show that language, regardless
of its mutability, is a common characteristic shared by his community,
thereby easily including language as a characteristic of national
origin. 183
C. Burden of Proof Under The Race Directive
Similar to the burden of proof framework in Title VII, 8 4 The
Race Directive and The Recommendation address both direct and
180. The "'distinct community' test ... permits a fairly high degree of self-
identification and allows the concept of ethnic origin, at least, to be defined by virtue
of behavior which the individual could change." Id.
181. Guild, supra note 105, at 418.
182. See, for example, Garcia v. Gloor, in which the court stated that the
plaintiff was "fully bilingual." Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980).
"He chose deliberately to speak Spanish instead of English..." 618 F.2d at 271.
But see EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D.
Tex. 2000) (finding expert testimony presents psycho-linguistic information in
support of language's immutability).
183. The plaintiff's burden is easily met because bilingual language ability
correlates highly with being of foreign ancestry, and the ability is clearly a common
characteristic of the national origin group of the bilingual individual. See Census
Information, supra note 33.
184. See supra Part I.B. The European Union labels the two types of
discrimination as "direct" and "indirect" discrimination. The Race Directive, supra
note 91, art. 2. Domestic courts name the two types "disparate treatment, which is
similar to the European Union's "direct" discrimination, and "disparate impact,"
which is similar to the European Union's "indirect" discrimination. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
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indirect discrimination.' 85  Indirect discrimination, like disparate
impact discrimination under Title VII, provides that a policy is
discriminatory if it is a facially neutral requirement but more
negatively impacts a protected group than it does others subject to the
rule.186  Some subtle differences in the language of The
Recommendation's definition as compared with the U.S. definition of
disparate impact shed light on the different approach that the
European Union takes towards workplace discrimination.
Specifically, The Recommendation states that indirect discrimination
"shall mean cases where an apparently neutral factor... cannot be as
easily complied with, or disadvantages, persons belonging to a group
designated by a ground such as . . .language . . . national or ethnic
origin ... ."'87 The plaintiff need only show that it is on some level
more difficult for the plaintiff to comply with the rule than it is for
other employees, and this is an easier burden for the plaintiff to
meet. 1 88  Under the EU approach, the U.S. courts' rationale that
bilinguals do not experience a disparate impact from English-only
rules falls apart because the question becomes not whether the
individual is able to comply, but whether it is more difficult for the
individual to comply.' 89
185. The Race Directive, supra note 91, art. 2; The Recommendation, supra
note 7, § I(1)(b)-(c).
186. The Recommendation, supra note 7, § I(1)(c). This definition comes
from The Recommendation, but The Recommendation is authoritative on
interpretation of The Race Directive. See Howard, supra note 171, at 486.
187. The Recommendation, supra note 7, § I(l)(c) (emphasis added).
188. Id. The Recommendation's language sets out in its definition that when
compliance is merely more difficult for a protected class, the policy is considered
discriminatory. Id. The psycho-linguistic findings presented in Premier Operator
certainly would show that an English-only rule is not as easily complied with by a
bilingual employee. EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066,
1070 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
189. E.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that the
plaintiff was "fully bilingual" and that he "chose deliberately to speak Spanish
instead of English"). This argument falls apart because it is less relevant that the
speaker chooses to speak a particular language and more relevant that there is a
higher degree of difficulty for a bilingual employee in controlling his or her
language. The fact that a bilingual individual has to even face the possibility of
controlling the language that he uses makes the rule more difficult for him to comply
with than a native English-speaker because the English speaker will not have the
additional burden of having to control which language is spoken at a particular time.
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Even more important in the EU burden of proof framework is the
absence of a requirement for statistical evidence of a negative impact
on the protected class at issue.' 90 It is sufficient for the plaintiff to
show a "potential disadvantage" for a protected class.'91 Although the
U.S. requirement of providing statistical evidence of disparate impact
was not originally applied to the kinds of subjective factors that are
affected by English-only rules, 192 plaintiffs are nevertheless required
to provide subjective statistics that are difficult to compile in their
prima facie case of discrimination. 93 Thus, the plaintiff under the EU
approach is relieved of the requirement of statistical evidence of a
disparity in subjective factors and bears a significantly lower burden
of proof as compared to a U.S. plaintiff. 194
D. The Recommendation
The Recommendation is a guideline set out to propose the
parameters of legislation to protect individuals from discrimination. 195
It is set out by the Council of Europe, a separate body from the
European Union that regularly recommends anti-discrimination
legislation, 196 of which all member States of the European Union are
With monolingual English speakers, there simply is no choice, and therefore no
additional burden. See generally Colon, supra note 35, at 252 (arguing that the risk
of violating English-only rules only exists for non-native English speakers).
190. Guild, supra note 105, at 420.
191. Id.
192. E.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 444 (1982); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989). The first cases to deal with disparate
impact addressed easily-quantifiable, disparate results, such as the number of
African Americans who did not receive a promotion. See, e.g., Teal, 457 U.S. at
440-41. This is in contrast to the disparate impact alleged in English-only cases,
which turns mostly on cognitive, subjective results that are difficult to quantify. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (N.D. Tex.
2000).
193. "While such statistics are often difficult to compile, whether the protected
group has been disadvantaged turns on quantifiable data [and] may depend on
subjective factors not easily quantified." Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480,
1486 (9th Cir. 1993).
194. Id.
195. The Recommendation, supra note 7, Explanatory Memorandum, 1.
196. Id. 2.
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also members. 197 For this reason, the force of The Recommendation,
although political and not legislative in nature,' 98 has interpretive
value on The Race Directive and vice versa.1 99  While The
Recommendation does not provide any basis for sanctions or legal
remedy for failure to comply with its framework, the European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance 200 (ECRI) can publicly
criticize governments for not complying with it in its periodic reports
on each Member State.20' The Recommendation's influence on The
Race Directive adds support to prohibiting discrimination based on
national origin of the people of the European Union, and specifically,
prohibiting discrimination based on language. 20 2  The
Recommendation is broad in identifying specific classes of protected
people and characteristics. 203  In fact, an open-ended scope was
intended in The Recommendation so as to allow it to evolve with
changing times.20 4 This flexibility solves the problem that Title VII
faces of addressing issues that were not present at the time of its
creation, such as English-only rules.20 5 As the promulgating entity of
The Recommendation, the ECRI's goal is to take all necessary
measures to combat, among other things, prejudice on the grounds of
language.20 6  Therefore, it is not surprising that The
Recommendation's definition of direct discrimination specifically
197. Howard, supra note 171, at 469.
198. Id. at 469.
199. Id. at 486.
200. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance is the entity
that makes the recommendations. See Council of Europe, European Commission
against Racism, http://www.coe.intfr/e/humanjrights/ecri/1-ECRI/ (last visited
Nov. 4, 2007). The ECRI is a subsidiary of the Council of Europe. Id.
201. Howard, supra note 171, at 471.
202. The Recommendation, supra note 7, Explanatory Memorandum, 4.
203. Id. 6.
204. Id.; Howard, supra note 171, at 473.
205. Some U.S. courts rely on the lack of evidence of congressional intent to
protect language from discrimination as a basis for rejecting EEOC guidelines and to
subsequently rule that language is not protected by Title VII. See supra notes 61-62.
English-only rules, however, had not received any significant attention when Title
VII was enacted. Id.
206. The Recommendation, supra note 7, § I(l)(b); Howard, supra note 171, at
469.
2007]
35
Thorpe-Lopez: America's Melting Pot: Language Not Included. U.S. Workplace Lang
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
252 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
includes "any differential treatment based on ground such as race,
colour, [or] language " ... 207
Two parts of this definition are important to examine. The first,
and most obvious, is the actual inclusion of the word "language" in
the text of the definition. 20 8 Language is a protected class in and of
itself, and therefore a plaintiff is not burdened with the problem, as
one is under Title VII, of correlating language with another protected
class.2 °9  The second pertinent part of the definition is that
"differential treatment" 210 is a lower standard than Title VII's
"adversely effect employment" 21' standard, making it an easier burden
for a plaintiff to satisfy. "Differential" means that the treatment is
merely "able to cause varying results;,,212 not necessarily in a very
significantly negative manner. The use of an English-only rule in the
workplace easily has the effect of causing varying results, even if it is
only slightly more difficult for the bilingual speaker to speak only
English than it is for the monolingual English speaker.21 3  The
bilingual speaker has more difficulty complying with the rule, and
therefore the rule has a varying result from one worker to the next.214
Under this theory, domestic courts could not rule English-only rules
non-discriminatory merely because a bilingual employee is capable of
compliance. 215  So, under The Recommendation's definition, the
English-only rules of U.S. employers clearly would be considered
discriminatory.
207. The Recommendation, supra note 7, § I(1)(b) (emphasis added).
208. Id.
209. The correlation between language and national origin must be argued in
order to bring a Title VII claim. See supra notes 89-90.
210. Id. "The meaning of the expression 'differential treatment' is wide and
includes any distinction, exclusion, restriction, preference, or omission ..... The
Recommendation, supra note 7, Explanatory Memorandum, 12.
211. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (West 2007).
212. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL WEBSTER'S POCKET DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 163 (2001).
213. Even if a bilingual employee is capable of compliance, he still is more
likely than a monolingual employee to inadvertently switch to another language,
while the monolingual English speaker runs no such risk. Colon, supra note 35, at
250-52.
214. Id.
215. See id.
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CONCLUSION
Without a Supreme Court ruling on English-only workplace rules,
there is still time for the United States to consider the EU approach to
language valuation. While the United States and the European Union
are different entities, both in their makeup and in their languages
spoken, the underlying rationale behind discrimination protection is
the same: to protect the individual characteristics that society values.
Language deserves protection from discrimination either as an integral
aspect of national origin or, as in the European Union, as a
characteristic so valued personally and professionally in a global
world that it deserves unique protection. The current framework
under Title VII fails to adequately address English-only claims in a
way that recognizes the import of bilingualism. The European Union,
on the other hand, provides a model framework to address language
discrimination and dispels, as unwarranted, fears that multilingual
integration will lead to societal turmoil. Consideration of the EU
approach will guide the United States in resolving the issue of
English-only rules, at least in some instances, as a discriminatory
practice. The EU framework as a model will serve as proof that when
it comes to language, there is nothing to be afraid of.
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